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Recent Decisions
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
CONAWAY v. DEANE: TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, FROM THIS
DAY FORWARD—MARYLAND’S UNFIT MARRIAGE TO
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
RACHEL A. SHAPIRO*
In Conaway v. Deane,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed
for the first time the constitutionality of a statutory prohibition on
same-sex marriage in Maryland.2 The Conaway majority upheld the
statute under rational basis review after finding that sexual orientation
does not establish “suspect class” status for equal protection purposes,3 despite Maryland’s two-part definition of suspectness, which
compelled a different result.4 In denying suspect class status on the
basis of sexual orientation, the majority unreflectively adopted two
new federal Fourteenth Amendment indicia of suspectness into its
own definition, even though prior Maryland courts had elected not to
incorporate those factors into Maryland’s suspectness test.5 In doing
so, the court defeated Maryland’s long-celebrated independence from
the federal Constitution’s equal protection analysis and may have
locked Maryland courts into step with an increasingly conservative Supreme Court of the United States.6 Moreover, not only did the Conaway majority unjustly deprive same-sex couples of deserved suspect
classification, but it also divested future Maryland groups seeking susCopyright  2009 by Rachel A. Shapiro.
* Rachel A. Shapiro is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of
Law where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. The author extends special
thanks to Professor Gordon Young and Professor Jana Singer. The author is equally grateful to Kerry T. Cooperman for his unfailing encouragement and helpful input. Last, the
author owes particular thanks to Heather R. Pruger for her patience, hard work, and invaluable insight.
1. 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part III.B. Conaway also analyzed the statute in the context of gender discrimination and fundamental rights, concluding that the statute neither made a genderbased distinction nor implicated a fundamental right. See infra Part III.A, C. This Note
addresses only the court’s equal protection analysis.
4. See infra Parts II.C, IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
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pect classification of the potentially greater equal protection Maryland’s own constitution has historically provided.7 Instead, the court
should have applied, or at least given due weight to, Maryland’s own
suspect class definition and deemed same-sex couples a suspect class.8
I.

THE CASE

In June and July 2004, nine same-sex couples, appellees, sought
marriage licenses from courts in Baltimore City and several counties
in Maryland.9 Each time, the clerks of those courts denied the
couples’ applications.10 Under Maryland law, no individual may
marry within the state without a license issued by the clerk for the
county in which the marriage is performed.11 If a clerk finds “a legal
reason why the applicants should not be married,” he or she must
withhold the license unless ordered by the court to issue it.12 In this
case, the clerks denied the couples’ license applications pursuant to
Family Law Article, section 2-201,13 which provides that “[o]nly a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this State.”14
Thus, on July 7, 2004, appellees filed a joint complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, naming the various clerks as defendants.15
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 238, 932 A.2d 571, 582 (2007). Additionally, a
homosexual male who expressed a wish to apply for a marriage license in the future joined
the couples as an appellee. Id.
10. Id. at 239, 932 A.2d at 582.
11. Id. at 238, 932 A.2d at 581–82 (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-401(a) (West
2002)).
12. Id., 932 A.2d at 582 (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-405(e)).
13. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201.
14. Id.; Conaway, 401 Md. at 239, 932 A.2d at 582.
15. Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at *2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan.
20, 2006), rev’d, Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007). The defendant
clerks include Frank Conaway, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, and four
additional county clerks. Id. After appellees filed their complaint, three parties filed motions to intervene as defendants. Conaway, 401 Md. at 241, 932 A.2d at 583. Robert P.
Duckworth, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, filed the first motion to
intervene, arguing that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees “w[ould] create uncertainty with” respect to his duties as clerk, and “would . . . subject [him] to [possible] civil
and criminal [litigation].” Duckworth v. Deane, 393 Md. 524, 530–31, 903 A.2d 883, 887
(2006). Next, eight members of the Maryland General Assembly attempted to intervene,
claiming “that invalidation of” the marriage statute “would be a judicial encroachment
upon [their legislative] authority.” Id. at 531–32, 903 A.2d at 887 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Third, Toni Marie Davis, a resident of Baltimore City, filed a motion to
intervene, claiming that “the homosexual lifestyle” was offensive to her religious beliefs in
violation of her First Amendment right to practice her religion. Id. at 532–33, 903 A.2d at
888. The circuit court denied these motions and each intervener noted an appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 533, 903 A.2d at 888. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of
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The complaint alleged that Family Law Article, section 2-201 (1) unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of gender in violation of
Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (“MDR”), also known
as the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”); (2) unjustifiably discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the equal protection provisions of Article 24 of the MDR; (3) constituted an
“unjustified, disparate deprivation of plaintiffs’ fundamental right to
marry,” thereby violating the equal protection component of Article
24; and (4) inhibited, in violation of the due process provisions of
Article 24 of the MDR, same-sex couples’ fundamental rights to
marriage.16
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.17 The
trial judge granted plaintiffs’ motion and denied defendants’ crossmotion, finding that exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is a
sex-based classification that violates Article 46 of the MDR.18 The
court noted that such a sex-based classification called for strict scrutiny under the ERA.19 Ruling that section 2-201 was not “narrowly
tailored to serve any compelling governmental interests,” the court
deemed the statute unconstitutional.20
The circuit court stayed enforcement of its ruling pending resolution of the expected appeal because of the possible consequences of
its ruling on clerks’ offices throughout Maryland.21 The clerks
promptly appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.22 Before the
Court of Special Appeals reviewed the case, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative to determine whether
section 2-201 was constitutional.23

certiorari before the intermediate court could decide the appeal and affirmed. Id. at 533,
545, 903 A.2d at 888, 895.
16. Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *3.
17. Id. at *2.
18. Id. at *3, *9.
19. Id. at *3.
20. Id. The trial opinion noted that under strict scrutiny, courts will only uphold a
classification if the government can show that the classification was “‘suitably tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.’” Id. at *6 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). According to the Court of Appeals, the Circuit Court
“expressly declined to address [the] Appellees’ [Article 24] equal protection and substantive due process arguments.” Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 237–38, 932 A.2d 571, 581
(2007).
21. Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *9.
22. Conaway, 401 Md. at 238, 932 A.2d at 581.
23. Id.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR407.txt

960
II.

unknown

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

Seq: 4

17-JUN-09

11:33

[VOL. 68:957

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Like the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
equal protection guarantees under the Maryland Constitution require
courts to strictly scrutinize laws that distinguish “suspect” classes.24
However, Maryland courts have consistently reserved the right to interpret Maryland’s equal protection guarantees differently from the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Equal Protection Clause where
the former provision provides greater protection to individual liberties.25 Maryland’s “suspect class” definition differs from the Supreme
Court’s test for suspectness, leaving open the possibility that Maryland
courts could discover new suspect classes under Maryland’s own constitution, where the Fourteenth Amendment would find none.26
A. Maryland Courts Apply a Three-Tiered Analytical Framework of
Scrutiny to Claims that Arise Under Article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights and Examine Claims of
Discrimination Against Suspect Classes under the
Strictest of These Tiers
Incorporating parts of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause,27 Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides
“[t]hat no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his
freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the
judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”28 Although Article
24 lacks an express equal protection clause similar to the Fourteenth
Amendment, Maryland courts have established that Article 24 contains both due process and equal protection principles.29
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from “depriv[ing] any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
28. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 24.
29. Specifically, Maryland courts have held that Article 24’s due process provision embodies the spirit of equal protection. See, e.g., Neifert v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 395 Md. 486,
504, 910 A.2d 1100, 1111 (2006) (“Although Article 24 does not contain an express equal
protection clause, this Court has held that the concept of equal protection is embodied
within the Article.”); Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704, 426 A.2d 929, 940–41
(1981) (“Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause,
we deem it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the due process
requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights.”). For more Court of Appeals cases
recognizing that equal protection is embodied in the due process requirement of Article
24, see Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s County, 390 Md. 145, 171 n.17, 887 A.2d
1060, 1075 n.17 (2005); Frankel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Md. Sys., 361 Md. 298,
312–13, 761 A.2d 324, 332 (2000); Kirsch v. Prince George’s County, 331 Md. 89, 96, 626
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Maryland courts apply one of three levels of constitutional scrutiny when a party challenges legislation under either the due process
or equal protection components of Article 24. First, courts may subject legislation to “strict scrutiny.”30 Under this standard, courts presume that the law at issue contravenes Article 24 absent a showing that
the law is “‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’”31
A statute subject to this standard must also be “suitably tailored” to
serve that interest.32 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has noted that
this standard is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,” typically leading to
the challenged statute’s nullification.33 To merit strict scrutiny, the
court has explained, a claimant must show that either (1) the statute
implicates Article 24’s due process clause by infringing upon a “fundamental right” or (2) the law triggers Article 24’s equal protection principles by distinguishing a “suspect class” of persons.34 The court in
Attorney General v. Waldron specified that “classifications based on race,
national origin, and ancestry” are inherently suspect and subject to
this standard.35
Alternatively, courts may apply “heightened scrutiny.”36 To survive this intermediate level of scrutiny, a statute must be “reasonable,
not arbitrary,” and must serve as “a fair and substantial” means to
achieve the legislation’s purpose.37 Heightened scrutiny, although a
less exacting standard than strict scrutiny, “does not tolerate random
speculation concerning possible justification for a challenged enactment; rather, it pursues the actual purpose of a statute and seriously
examines the means chosen to effectuate that purpose.”38 This level
of scrutiny is triggered under equal protection principles when legislaA.2d 372, 375 (1993); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 616 n.4,
458 A.2d 758, 768 n.4 (1983). See generally 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES, Appendix 3 at 3-59 to 3-63 (4th ed.
2006) (listing state constitutional provisions that explicitly address equal rights).
30. See, e.g., Waldron, 289 Md. at 705–06, 426 A.2d at 941 (defining “strict scrutiny” as
the top tier of judicial review).
31. Id. at 706, 426 A.2d at 941 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972)).
32. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 356, 601 A.2d 102, 109 (1992).
33. Waldron, 289 Md. at 707–08, 426 A.2d at 942 (quoting Gerald Gunther, The Supreme
Court 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
34. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 705–06, 426 A.2d at 941 (describing the type of statute that
is subject to strict scrutiny review).
35. Id. at 706, 426 A.2d at 941–42 (citations omitted).
36. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 641, 458 A.2d
758, 781 (1983) (describing heightened scrutiny as a tier of judicial review that is less
exacting than strict scrutiny).
37. Id. at 642, 458 A.2d at 782.
38. Id. Like strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny can apply under either Article 24 due
process principles or Article 24 equal protection principles. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 711,
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tion involves “sensitive, although not necessarily suspect criteria of
classification.”39 Classifications subject to heightened scrutiny under
Article 24 have historically included legislative distinctions based on
gender,40 illegitimacy,41 and “classification[s] between children of legal residents and children of illegal aliens with regard to a free public
education.”42
“Rational basis” review is the lowest level of scrutiny under Maryland’s framework.43 Under this standard, the court will presume a
statute’s constitutionality under Article 24 unless the party challenging the statute can show that the law is “clearly arbitrary.”44 Courts
applying rational basis review defer largely to the legislature, and
rarely strike down laws as unconstitutional.45
B. Maryland Courts Have Stressed the Independence of State Equal
Protection Analysis by Acknowledging the Possibility of Different
Outcomes Under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Maryland equal protection cases have long celebrated Article 24’s
independence from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.46 Courts have treated the two provisions as distinct even
426 A.2d at 944 (explaining that heightened scrutiny is applicable in either of two cases,
which “parallel the two groupings that trigger application of the strict scrutiny test”).
39. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 641, 458 A.2d at 781 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Waldron, 289 Md. at 711, 426 A.2d at 944). Although this Note will focus solely on
equal protection principles, it is worth noting that a party can trigger intermediate review
using due process principles by showing that the statute affects “important” personal interests or significantly interferes with liberty or denies “a benefit vital to the individual.” Waldron, 289 Md. at 711, 426 A.2d at 944.
40. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 357, 601 A.2d 102, 109 (1992) (citing Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
41. Id. (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968)).
42. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217–18, 224 (1982)). In Waldron, the court
also reviewed “a classification under which certain persons were denied the right to practice for compensation” under heightened scrutiny. See id. (noting Waldron as applying a
heightened standard of review). Although the Waldron court itself professed to use only
rational basis review, see Waldron, 289 Md. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948, later cases deemed the
Waldron standard of review to be heightened. See, e.g., Murphy, 325 Md. at 357, 601 A.2d at
109 (classifying Waldron as a case decided under a heightened standard of review).
43. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 706–07, 426 A.2d at 942 (explaining that courts use rational
basis when “neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right or interest is implicated”).
44. Murphy, 325 Md. at 356, 601 A.2d at 108.
45. See Hargrove v. Bd. of Trustees of Md. Ret. Sys., 310 Md. 406, 428, 529 A.2d 1372,
1383 (1987) (explaining that legislation receiving rational basis review “almost invariably”
survive constitutional challenges).
46. See infra notes 47–83 and accompanying text.
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when, in a specific case, the outcome would be the same under both
provisions, by acknowledging the possibility that the two provisions
could yield different conclusions in the future.47 Collectively, cases
analyzing Article 24 indicate that (1) Article 24 is independent and
can provide greater protection of individual rights than the Fourteenth
Amendment,48 and (2) analysis under Article 24 is alone sufficient to
prove a violation of equal protection and courts need not assess equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment at all when legislation
clearly violates Maryland’s equal protection guarantees.49
In Attorney General v. Waldron,50 the first landmark Article 24
equal protection case in Maryland, the Court of Appeals used heightened scrutiny to strike down legislation prohibiting a retired judge
who had received a pension from practicing law.51 Although the Waldron court decided that in this specific case analysis under federal and
state equal protection guarantees would have the same result,52 the
court stressed that Maryland courts can examine Article 24 equal protection separately from equal protection under the U.S. Constitution.
First, the court noted, although Article 24 does not include equal protection language, equal protection principles are “embodied in [Article 24’s] due process requirement.”53 The court explained that, likely
because the words do not appear in the text of Article 24, Maryland
courts have applied equal protection “in like manner and to the same
extent as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”54
The Waldron court repeatedly and ardently emphasized, however, that
“the equal protection guaranties of Article 24 and the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment are independent” and “capable of divergent effect.”55
The court noted that, while Supreme Court opinions interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment are controlling with respect to state analysis
of the Fourteenth Amendment, those cases are merely persuasive in
47. See infra notes 52–59, 62–64, 71 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
50. 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
51. Id. at 684–87, 717, 728–29, 426 A.2d at 931–32, 948, 954. Having determined that
the statute “neither impact[ed] upon rights recognized as ‘fundamental’ nor classifie[d]
along lines determined to be ‘suspect,’” the court refused to apply strict scrutiny to strike
the statute down. Id. at 716–17, 426 A.2d at 947–48. However, in practice, the court also
declined to apply mere rational basis review because, although the statute did not quite
infringe on fundamental rights, it did affect “vital personal interests” and, as such, the
court determined that it ought not “reach out and speculate as to the existence of possible
justifications for the challenged enactment.” Id. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948.
52. Id. at 714, 426 A.2d at 946.
53. Id. at 704, 426 A.2d at 940–41.
54. Id., 426 A.2d at 941.
55. Id. at 705, 426 A.2d at 941.
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assessing equal protection under Article 24.56 Further, the court
pointed out that “a violation of one [equal protection provision] is
not necessarily a violation of the other.”57 Importantly, the Waldron
court also noted that a state court could exceed federal protection of
individual liberties by declaring unconstitutional a statute that might
have passed federal constitutional scrutiny.58 Indeed, the court continued, “a discriminatory classification may be an unconstitutional
breach of the equal protection doctrine under . . . Article 24 alone.”59
Subsequent Maryland courts interpreting equal protection under
Article 24 have similarly reserved the right to reach different conclusions under the two constitutions. For example, in Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Board of Education,60 the Court of Appeals used rational basis
scrutiny to uphold Maryland’s system of public school finance.61 The
Hornbeck court restated the Waldron principle that the federal and
state equal protection provisions “are independent.”62 Then, despite
concluding that the two equal protection guarantees would yield the
same result, the Hornbeck court analyzed the provisions separately, dividing its analysis into “Federal Equal Protection”63 and “State Equal
Protection.”64
Almost a decade after Hornbeck, the Court of Appeals heard another landmark Article 24 equal protection case, Murphy v. Edmonds.65
In Murphy, the court used rational basis review to declare a statutory
cap on non-economic damages for personal injuries constitutional
under Article 24.66 The Murphy court considered the plaintiff’s equal
protection claim “in light of cases applying the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as cases applying Article
24.”67 Although the Murphy court deemed federal case law under the
Fourteenth Amendment persuasive and stated that Maryland’s equal
protection principles apply “in like manner and to the same extent” as
56. Id.
57. Id. at 714, 426 A.2d at 946.
58. Id. at 714–15 n.20, 426 A.2d at 946 n.20.
59. Id. at 715, 426 A.2d at 947.
60. 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
61. Id. at 653, 656, 458 A.2d at 788, 789.
62. Id. at 640, 458 A.2d at 781.
63. See id. at 642–45, 458 A.2d at 782–84 (pointing to federal precedent on equal protection under the U.S. Constitution to explain why the public school system does not violate federal equal protection).
64. See id. at 645–53, 458 A.2d at 784–88 (explaining why the school system should not
be strictly scrutinized under Article 24).
65. 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
66. Id. at 367, 370, 601 A.2d at 114, 116.
67. Id. at 355, 601 A.2d at 108.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR407.txt

2009]

unknown

CONAWAY V. DEANE

Seq: 9

17-JUN-09

11:33

965

the Fourteenth Amendment, it again acknowledged the well-settled
principle that the federal and state equal protection provisions are
“obviously independent and capable of divergent application.”68
One year later, the Court of Appeals in Kirsch v. Prince George’s
County69 similarly applied rational basis review to strike down a zoning
ordinance that differentiated between permissible residential tenant
classes based on tenants’ occupations.70 The Kirsch court again
treated equal protection under the two constitutions as distinct, assessing the zoning ordinance under both the Fourteenth Amendment
and Article 24.71 And again, the court deferred to the well-established
notion that “the two provisions are independent of one another, and
a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other.”72
The next year, in Verzi v. Baltimore County,73 the Court of Appeals
yet again struck down legislation under rational basis review.74 This
time, the court deemed unconstitutional a Baltimore County requirement that licensed tow operators maintain places of business in the
county in order to be eligible to receive police calls to tow disabled
vehicles.75 The court stressed that Supreme Court decisions interpreting the federal equal protection clause are persuasive, but not controlling, authority for its interpretation of Article 24.76 To underscore the
68. Id. at 354–55, 601 A.2d at 108.
69. 331 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372 (1993).
70. Id. at 104, 107–08, 626 A.2d at 379, 381.
71. Id. at 91, 626 A.2d at 373.
72. Id. at 97, 626 A.2d at 376.
73. 333 Md. 411, 635 A.2d 967 (1994).
74. See id. at 425, 635 A.2d at 974 (identifying the rational basis test as the proper
standard of review to determine the constitutionality of a county ordinance at issue in the
case).
75. Id. at 413, 427, 932 A.2d at 967–68, 975.
76. Id. at 417, 932 A.2d at 970; see also Neifert v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 395 Md. 486,
504–05, 910 A.2d 1100, 1111 (2006) (“United States Supreme Court cases applying the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are binding on this Court when
applying that clause and are persuasive when applying Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights.”); Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 715, 718–19, 908 A.2d 1220, 1234, 1236–37 (2006)
(explaining that Article 24 and the Fourteenth Amendment are “capable of divergent application,” and that Supreme Court interpretations of the latter Constitution are “persuasive” before discussing alienage as an “inherently suspect” classification); Frankel v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Md. Sys., 361 Md. 298, 312–13, 761 A.2d 324, 331–32 (2000) (stating, before using rational basis review to strike down a tuition policy discriminating against
certain in-state residents, that “while United States Supreme Court cases applying the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are, of course, binding upon us in
the application of that federal constitutional provision, and are regarded as persuasive in
the application of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, nevertheless the federal and state
guarantees of equal protection are obviously independent and capable of divergent application” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Md. Aggregates Ass’n v. State, 337
Md. 658, 671 n.8, 655 A.2d 886, 893 n.8 (1995))).
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court’s right to interpret Article 24 independently, the court stated
that it frequently treated the equal protection guarantees of Article 24
and the U.S. Constitution’s as “complementary but independent,” and
commented that “‘a discriminatory classification may be an unconstitutional breach of the equal protection doctrine under the authority
of Article 24 alone.’”77
More recently, in Frankel v. Board of Regents of the University of Maryland System,78 the Court of Appeals maintained the stance that courts
could analyze Article 24 equal protection independently of the Fourteenth Amendment, and further clarified that such an analysis is
alone sufficient to establish an equal protection violation.79 Here, the
court employed rational basis review to deem unconstitutional a university’s policy precluding in-state tuition status for students whose primary monetary support came from an out-of-state source.80 First, the
Frankel court followed its predecessors in acknowledging Article 24’s
general independence from the Fourteenth Amendment with respect
to equal protection.81 Next, in assessing whether the university’s policy was constitutional, the Frankel court treated the two equal protection provisions as distinct—even though the plaintiff brought equal
protection claims under both the U.S. Constitution and Article 24, the
court concluded that it was not necessary to even touch upon the
plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims because
the university’s policy clearly violated Article 24.82 Accordingly, the
court clarified:
By underscoring the independence of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, we do not suggest that the result in this
case would be any different if the sole issue were whether the
Policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We simply are making it clear that our
77. Verzi, 333 Md. at 417, 635 A.2d at 970 (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md.
683, 715, 426 A.2d 929, 947 (1981)).
78. 361 Md. 298, 761 A.2d 324.
79. See id. at 312–13 & n.3, 761 A.2d at 331–32 & n.3 (recognizing Article 24’s general
independence from the Fourteenth Amendment and assessing the policy’s constitutionality under Article 24 alone, even though plaintiffs brought equal protection claims under
both constitutions).
80. Id. at 314–15, 761 A.2d at 332–33.
81. See id. at 313, 761 A.2d at 332 (“[W]hile United States Supreme Court cases applying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are, of course, binding
upon us in the application of that federal constitutional provision, and are regarded as
persuasive in the application of Article 24 . . . the federal and state guarantees of equal
protection are obviously independent and capable of divergent application.” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
82. Id. at 312, 761 A.2d at 331.
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decision is based exclusively upon Article 24 and is in no way
dependent upon the federal constitutional provision.83
C. Maryland Courts Consider Only Two of the Four Indicia of
Suspectness that the Supreme Court Examines to Decide Whether
a Class is Suspect
The Supreme Court of the United States examines four indicia of
suspectness to determine whether a group is suspect under the Fourteenth Amendment.84 By contrast, Maryland courts consider only two
of the four federal factors to decide whether a group constitutes a
suspect class under Article 24.85
The Supreme Court articulated its first test for evaluating the suspectness of a class for equal protection purposes in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.86 In the oft-cited footnote four, the Court explained that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition,” suggesting that classifications drawn along those
lines should be “subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation.”87
Since Carolene Products, the Supreme Court has examined four
major indicia of “discrete and insular minorities” for purposes of applying strict scrutiny. First, the Court considers whether a class has
suffered a history of purposeful unequal treatment or discrimination.88 Next, the Court may look at whether the group’s unique characteristics bear any relation to the group’s ability to contribute to
society.89 A third factor that the Court may consider is whether the
83. Id. at 313 n.3, 761 A.2d at 332 n.3.
84. See infra notes 86–100 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 101–105 and accompanying text.
86. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
87. Id. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (refusing to confer suspect classification to “[c]lose relatives” after finding that the class has not been subjected to a history
of purposeful unequal treatment); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)
(holding that uniformed police officers over the age of fifty have not historically been
subjected to discrimination and are not a suspect class); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion) (concluding that “classifications based upon [gender] are inherently suspect, and [subject] to strict judicial scrutiny,” in part because women have suffered a history of discrimination); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S 1, 28 (1973) (holding that wealth is not a suspect classification after determining
that the plaintiff’s class has not been “subjected to . . . a history of purposeful unequal
treatment”).
89. E.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (refusing to consider age a suspect class because,
among other reasons, the “aged” have not been “subjected to unique disabilities on the
basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities”); Frontiero, 411 U.S.
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group has endured political powerlessness.90 Last, the Court occasionally looks at whether the groups’ defining traits are immutable.91
The Supreme Court applies these factors in a flexible manner, rather
than requiring each to be fulfilled.92 In other words, the Court has
never applied the factors as if they formed a conjunctive elements
test93 and sometimes chooses not to discuss every factor.94 Normally,
courts balance the totality of these factors to decide whether a classification should receive strict scrutiny under the federal Equal Protection Clause.95
Courts balancing the factors typically afford the second two factors—political powerlessness and immutability—less weight than the
others.96 Those factors are mere “supplements” to suspect class analysis.97 By contrast “the first two factors—history of intentional discrimination and relationship of classifying characteristic to a person’s
ability to contribute—have always been present when heightened
scrutiny has been applied.”98 Because those first two factors are so
critical to suspect class analysis, they “could be considered as prerequisites to concluding a group is a suspect or quasi-suspect class.”99 Inat 686 (analogizing gender to recognized suspect criteria because “the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society”).
90. E.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (explaining that a suspect class can include a group
“‘relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process’” (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28)).
91. E.g., id.; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
92. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 888 (Iowa 2009) (noting the “flexible manner in which the Supreme Court has applied the four factors in the past”).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 889 n.16 (noting various Supreme Court cases in which some indicia of
suspectness were considered and not others).
95. See Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
107, 155 (1990) (“The individual factors . . . do not provide a precise formula for clearly
determining if and when a social group qualifies as a suspect class. Instead, the factors,
along with the mitigating concerns, interrelate. The case or narrative for suspect class
status must be constructed from the sum of these factors.”).
96. In particular, the Supreme Courts of Iowa and Connecticut stressed this discrepancy in their recent opinions upholding gay marriage. See infra notes 97–100. On April 3,
2009, the Supreme Court of Iowa struck down the state’s statutory ban on marriage after
deeming homosexuals a quasi-suspect class. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d, at 896, 906. Several
months prior to the Iowa decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court similarly considered
homosexuals a quasi-suspect class to invalidate the state’s ban on gay marriage under
heightened scrutiny. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431–32, 482
(Conn. 2008).
97. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d, at 889.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 889. See also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426 (considering the first two indicia of
suspectness “required” and the latter two merely “other considerations”).
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deed, the Supreme Court has placed “far greater weight—indeed . . .
dispositive weight” on those first two factors.100
To determine whether a group constitutes a suspect class under
Article 24, Maryland courts analyze only the two factors the Supreme
Court considers the most important. In two landmark equal protection cases, the Court of Appeals of Maryland defined suspect classification under Article 24. First, in Waldron, the court concluded that a
suspect class includes people who have either (1) experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment or (2) “‘been subjected to
unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly
indicative of their abilities.’”101 The Waldron court attributed this twofactor test to Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,102 a case that
had additionally considered “political powerlessness” in determining
suspectness.103 The Waldron court, however, did not include this
element.
The court in Hornbeck reiterated this simple two-part test, defining a “suspect class” as “a category of people who have experienced a
history of purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”104 By the time the Maryland Court of Appeals
reiterated this test in Hornbeck, the Supreme Court had already articulated all four indicia of suspectness.105 Nevertheless, the Hornbeck
court incorporated only two of the federal indicia into its definition.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Conaway v. Deane,106 the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment of the Baltimore City Circuit Court and upheld
the constitutionality of Family Law Article, section 2-201, which prohibits same-sex marriage.107 Writing for the majority, Judge Harrell
determined that the statute (1) “[did] not draw an impermissible sexbased distinction” in violation of the ERA, also known as Article 46 of
100. Id.
101. Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 706, 426 A.2d 929, 941 (1981) (quoting
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)).
102. See id. (using language from Murgia to articulate the two-factor test for identifying a
suspect class).
103. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
104. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 641, 458 A.2d 758, 781
(1983).
105. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (describing the indicia of suspectness
set forth in Supreme Court cases prior to 1992, when Hornbeck was decided).
106. 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007).
107. Id. at 237–39, 932 A.2d at 581–82.
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the MDR;108 (2) was not subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection provisions of Article 24 of the MDR because “sexual orientation [wa]s neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect” classification;109 and
(3) was not subject to strict scrutiny under the due process provisions
of Article 24 of the MDR because same-sex couples do not have a fundamental right to marry.110 Thus, the majority concluded that section
2-201 was not subject to strict scrutiny and was instead reviewable
under the less stringent rational basis standard, under which it was
constitutional.111
A. The Majority Concluded that a Statutory Ban on Same-Sex Marriage
Did Not Draw a Gender-Based Distinction
The Conaway majority first denied appellees’ claim that Family
Law Article, section 2-201 violated the ERA and was thus subject to
strict scrutiny.112 First, Judge Harrell explained, the legislative history
of the ERA suggested that the General Assembly “intended [it] to
combat discrimination between men and women as classes,” not between individuals of a different “sexual orientation.”113 Although the
court acknowledged that the General Assembly’s purpose for the ERA
was not formally documented, the majority bolstered its argument
with relevant “extrinsic sources.”114 Second, Judge Harrell continued,
Maryland precedent showed that the ERA was not designed to protect
individuals’ sexual orientations, but to prevent discrimination between the sexes as classes.115 Therefore, the majority concluded, un108. Id. at 246, 932 A.2d at 586.
109. Id. at 277, 932 A.2d at 606.
110. Id. at 315, 932 A.2d at 629.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 246, 932 A.2d at 586.
113. Id., 932 A.2d at 586–87.
114. Id. at 248, 932 A.2d at 587–88. Initially, the majority pointed to the stated purposes
of a commission designed by Governor Marvin Mandel to study the amendment’s postimplementation effects. See id. at 249, 932 A.2d at 588. One such purpose, the majority
found, “was to examine Maryland laws that, while not facially discriminatory, drew [genderbased] classifications . . . in their application.” Id. Next, the majority identified newspaper
accounts that viewed the newly passed amendment as assuring equal rights for the sexes as
classes. See id. at 249–50, 932 A.2d at 588–89. Moreover, “[b]ecause the 1972 General
Assembly considered in tandem the proposed federal and Maryland amendments,” the
majority pointed to quotes from the legislative history of the federal initiative that suggested that the amendment sought to prevent discrimination between sexes as classes. See
id. at 250–54, 932 A.2d at 589–91 (quoting statements from congressional committee hearings and floor debates).
115. See id. at 254–65, 932 A.2d at 591–98 (citing early ERA cases in which courts suggest
that the ERA’s purpose was “to remedy the long history of subordination of women in this
country, and to place men and women on equal ground as pertains to the enjoyment of
basic legal rights under the law”).
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less a law classifies men or women “to the exclusion of an entire
subsection of similarly situated members of the opposite sex,” the ERA
does not extend protection and rational basis applies, absent some
other application of heightened scrutiny.116 Third, the majority cited
to precedent in other jurisdictions that also suggested that the ERA
only prohibits discrimination between the sexes as classes.117 The majority focused on Singer v. Hara,118 which held that the contention that
Washington’s ERA protects same-sex marriages subverted the purpose
of its ERA “by expanding its scope beyond that which was undoubtedly intended by the majority of the citizens of this state who voted for
the amendment.”119 In fact, the Conaway majority noted, most state
courts have followed Rand v. Rand in disposing of equal rights challenges.120 Ultimately, the majority concluded that section 2-201 did
not trigger strict scrutiny under the ERA because it did not treat men
and women as separate classes for the benefit of one and not the
other, but rather “prohibit[ed] equally both men and women from
the same conduct.”121
116. Id. at 260, 264, 932 A.2d at 595, 597–98.
117. See id. at 265–67, 932 A.2d at 598–99 (“‘Cases from other state jurisdictions interpreting the breadth and meaning of their equal rights amendments are instructive in ascertaining the reach of Maryland’s [ERA].’” (quoting Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 512, 374
A.2d 900, 903 (1977))).
118. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1774).
119. Id. at 1194.
120. Conaway, 401 Md. at 265–66, 932 A.2d at 599.
121. Id. at 264, 932 A.2d at 598. Throughout the case, the court referred to the idea
that § 2-201 should not be analyzed under strict scrutiny because it does not discriminate
between the two sexes as classes, but equally bars both sexes from the same conduct, as the
“equal application theory.” See, e.g., id. at 266–67, 932 A.2d at 599 (referring to the argument that marriage laws are facially neutral because the laws prohibit men and women
equally from marrying a person of the same sex, and noting the appellees counter argument to such an “equal application theory”). In an important footnote, the majority first
clarified that this theory is distinct from the “separate but equal” approach that a plurality
of the court had previously rejected in Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum (Burning Tree I),
305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985). Conaway, 401 Md. at 260–61 n.26, 932 A.2d at 595 n.26.
That case concerned a statute that (1) conditioned tax benefits to country clubs on the
clubs’ agreement not to discriminate based on sex, but (2) exempted clubs whose “primary
purpose [was] to serve . . . members of a particular sex.” Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 56–57,
501 A.2d at 818–19 (plurality opinion). Ultimately, only a plurality of the court formed to
invalidate the “primary purpose” provision; however, a majority of judges in Burning Tree I
rejected the “separate but equal” argument that the provision was sex-neutral and thus did
not violate the ERA because, although gender-neutral by its language, the provision was discriminatory in its effect. See id. at 90–92, 501 A.2d at 835–36 (Eldridge, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (dismissing the “separate but equal” argument and concluding
that the antidiscrimination provision violated the ERA); id. at 87, 501 A.2d at 834 (Rodowsky, J., concurring) (same). The Conaway majority explained that while the plurality in
Burning Tree I deemed the statute violative of the ERA because it allowed, “albeit in genderneutral terms, the exclusion of the entire opposite sex by a uniform-gender club,” Family
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The Majority Found that a Statutory Ban on Same-Sex Marriage
Did Not Impact a Suspect or Quasi-Suspect Class

The majority decided that sexual orientation was not a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification, and on that basis rejected the argument
that the equal protection principles embedded in Article 24 required
the court to strictly scrutinize section 2-201.122 Notably, the majority
conceded in two short sentences that there is a history of purposeful
unequal treatment of gay and lesbian persons, and that such persons
are “subject to unique disabilities not truly indicative of their abilities
to contribute to meaningfully to society.”123 Nonetheless, the majority
agreed with most federal and state courts124 that homosexual persons
are not members of suspect or quasi-suspect classifications on two
grounds: (1) evidence that homosexuality is an immutable character-

Law Article, § 2-201 “in no way single[d] out an entire group of persons based on sex.”
Conaway, 401 Md. at 263–64 n.26, 932 A.2d at 597 n.26. The majority thus concluded that,
contrary to an argument made by Judge Battaglia in her dissenting opinion, “the ‘equal
application theory’ [was] not inconsistent with the plurality [opinion] in Burning Tree I.”
Id. at 264 n.26, 932 A.2d at 597 n.26.
Then, the Conaway majority rejected the same-sex couples’ assertion that, instead of
applying an “equal application theory,” the court should have examined how the statute
affects each person seeking to marry individually. Id. at 267, 270, 932 A.2d at 599, 602. The
couples relied on Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the landmark Supreme Court case
in which the Court held that a Virginia miscegenation statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, even though the statute “‘punish[ed] equally both the white and the Negro
participants in an interracial marriage.’” Conaway, 401 Md. at 267, 932 A.2d at 599–600
(alteration in original) (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 8). The majority rebuffed this analogy,
arguing that, while the “underlying purpose [of the Loving statute] was to sustain White
Supremacy,” in violation of the core purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, Family Law
Article, § 2-201 could not violate the core purposes of the ERA because it did not “differentiate between men and women as classes.” Id. at 269–70, 932 A.2d at 601–02.
122. Conaway, 401 Md. at 277, 932 A.2d at 605–06.
123. Id. at 282, 932 A.2d at 609. The majority later conceded again that “[i]t is clear that
homosexual persons, at least in terms of contemporary history, have been a disfavored
group in both public and private spheres of our society.” Id. at 285, 932 A.2d at 610. But
the majority quickly dismissed this argument because, “in light of the other indicia” of
suspectness, a mere “history of unequal treatment does not require [the court to] deem”
homosexuals a suspect class. Id., 932 A.2d at 610–11. The majority professed “instead [to]
view the circumstances as a whole in order to determine whether sexual orientation constitutes a protected classification.” Id. at 285–86, 932 A.2d at 611.
124. See id. at 280–81, 932 A.2d at 607–08 (listing cases in other jurisdictions refusing to
recognize sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class).

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR407.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 17

17-JUN-09

CONAWAY V. DEANE

11:33

973

istic is inconclusive;125 and (2) homosexual persons are not “politically powerless [enough to] constitute a suspect class.”126
C. The Majority Determined that the Statutory Ban on Same-Sex
Marriage Did Not Burden a Fundamental Right
Reasoning that same-sex couples lack the fundamental right to
marry, the majority determined that the due process provisions of Article 24 similarly did not require the court to assess section 2-201
under strict scrutiny.127 First, the majority insisted that the right at
issue was not a general right to marry, but more specifically the right
of same-sex couples to marry.128 In support of this assertion, the majority deemed inapplicable the precedent on which appellees relied to
assert that the proper inquiry was whether the right itself had been
historically enjoyed rather than who had enjoyed it.129 Moreover, the
majority argued that Maryland has always reserved the right to regulate who can and cannot marry within the State.130
125. Id. at 291, 932 A.2d at 614. Curiously, the majority focused on this immutability
factor despite the fact that no party addressed it in its brief. See id. at 292 n.57, 932 A.2d at
615 n.57. Moreover, the majority never “form[ed] any sort of merits-driven conclusion” on
the matter—instead, the majority simply found that “there does not appear to be a consensus yet among ‘experts’” on the topic. Id. at 293 n.57, 932 A.2d at 615–16 n.57.
126. Id. at 282, 932 A.2d at 609. The majority reasoned that evolution in Maryland’s
statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions show that gay and lesbian persons are not “politically powerless,” but rather exercise increasing political power. See id. at 286–90, 932
A.2d at 611–13 (describing relatively recent Maryland laws that afford various protections
against discrimination to homosexuals in areas including public accommodation, employment, housing, education, and child-custody); see also id. at 288–89, 932 A.2d at 612–13
(outlining briefly two relatively recent United States Supreme Court cases that protect
homosexuals from various forms of discrimination without deeming them a suspect class).
127. Id. at 294, 315, 932 A.2d at 616, 629.
128. See id. at 298–99, 932 A.2d at 619 (finding that the right to marry issue “is framed
more properly in terms of whether the right to choose same-sex marriage is fundamental”
(emphasis added)).
129. Id. at 300, 932 A.2d at 619. Particularly, the majority attacked appellees’ reliance
on Loving v. Virginia. See id., 932 A.2d at 619–20. Appellees argued that Loving stood for
the proposition that, despite the long history of prohibition against interracial marriages,
the Constitution guaranteed the right to marry to different-race couples just as it did for
single-race couples, thereby suggesting that the proper inquiry is whether the right itself
had been historically enjoyed rather than who had enjoyed it. Id. The majority rejected
the Loving analogy because the Loving Court had reasoned that marriage is “‘fundamental
to our very existence and survival,’” thereby suggesting that the Loving Court only contemplated unions between men and women. See id. at 300, 932 A.2d at 620 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
130. See id. at 305, 932 A.2d at 622–23 (stating that the fundamental right to marry in
Maryland is not absolute). The Conaway majority pointed out that Maryland law has always
regulated who may marry based on characteristics such as age, consanguinity, and mental
competence. See id. at 305–06, 932 A.2d at 622–23 (listing features that may justify the
basis of a State denial of a couple’s right to marry).
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Next, despite recognizing that Article 24’s due process concepts
are flexible and that the legal rights of homosexual persons are expanding,131 the Conaway majority refused to deem same-sex marriage
a fundamental right because (1) Maryland has traditionally expressly
limited marriage to those unions between members of the opposite
sex;132 (2) “nearly every other state in” the U.S. has placed comparable limits on marriage;133 and (3) the Supreme Court has declined to
deem same-sex marriage a fundamental right.134
D. The Majority Thus Applied Rational Basis Review and Found
Maryland’s Statutory Ban on Same-Sex Marriage to be
Constitutional
After determining that the statutory ban on same-sex marriage
did “not discriminate on the basis of sex,” implicate a suspect or quasisuspect class, or abridge a fundamental right to marriage, the court
concluded that “rational basis review is the correct standard of constitutional review.”135 The majority deemed the State’s alleged interest
in preserving the traditional, opposite-sex institution of marriage to
promote procreation legitimate and agreed that section 2-201 was a
sufficient means to that end.136 In other words, the majority determined that a sufficient link existed between opposite-sex marriage
and procreation because the traditional nuclear family137 is the “environment most conducive to the stable propagation and continuance
of the human race.”138 In so concluding, the majority dismissed the
same-sex couples’ argument that section 2-201 was not rationally re131. See id. at 308–09, 932 A.2d at 624–25 (characterizing the flexibility of due process
under Article 24 as “well-established,” and observing that the legal landscape in Maryland
“no doubt” is moving towards providing gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons more rights).
132. See id. at 312, 932 A.2d at 627 (claiming that “[e]ven a quick glance at the laws of
Maryland indicate that this State has long regarded marriage as a union between a man
and a woman,” and listing several Family Laws that suggest that the General Assembly approved only of heterosexual marriage).
133. Id. at 312–13, 932 A.2d at 627–28 (“With the exception of Massachusetts, virtually
every court to have considered the issue has held that same-sex marriage is not constitutionally protected as fundamental . . . .”).
134. Id. at 314, 932 A.2d at 628.
135. Id. at 315, 932 A.2d at 629.
136. Id. at 317–18, 932 A.2d at 630. The State additionally argued it had an interest in
maintaining its police power over the social institution of marriage, but the majority did
not address this argument. See id. at 323 n.70, 932 A.2d 634 n.70 (declining to address the
State’s police powers argument because the State’s interest in fostering procreation was
sufficient to sustain the same-sex marriage prohibition).
137. The majority noted that a traditional “nuclear” family generally consists of “a
mother, father, and children born to them during the marriage.” Id. at 320, 932 A.2d at
632.
138. Id. at 317, 932 A.2d at 630.
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lated to the State’s interest in fostering procreation as the statute was
(1) “overinclusive because children may be born into same-sex relationships through alternative methods of conception, including surrogacy, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and adoption;” (2)
“under-inclusive . . . because not all opposite-sex couples choose to
bear children,” and, in fact, some cannot do so because of infertility;
and (3) insufficiently linked to procreation because allowing same-sex
couples to marry would not discourage opposite-sex couples from
bearing children.139 The majority conceded that the couples’ arguments were “quite convincing[ ],”140 and even cited statistics to support the couples’ argument that there is a societal “trend towards the
gradual erosion of the traditional nuclear family.”141 Nevertheless,
the majority concluded that because, under rational basis, a statute
“need not be drawn with mathematical exactitude, and may contain
imperfections that result in some degree of inequality,” the mere possibility of procreation inherent in opposite-sex marriage supplied a sufficiently rational, if imperfect, link between opposite-sex marriage and
procreation.142 Thus, using rational basis review, the majority concluded that Maryland’s interest in fostering procreation was strong
enough to render section 2-201 constitutional.143
E. Three Judges Dissented, Arguing Either that the Same-Sex Marriage
Ban Was Unconstitutional or that the Court Should Have
Remanded the Case for Review Under a Higher Standard
of Scrutiny
Judge Raker dissented in part and concurred in part with the majority.144 Despite agreeing with the majority’s selection of rational basis scrutiny,145 Judge Raker parted with the majority in her belief that,
even under rational basis review, section 2-201 was unconstitutional
because it deprived “committed same-sex couples” of benefits available to opposite-sex couples in violation of the equal protection guarantee of Article 24.146 Judge Raker argued that the State’s alleged
139. Id. at 319, 932 A.2d at 631.
140. Id.; see also id. at 320, 932 A.2d at 632 (finding “some merit to [the couples’]
arguments”).
141. Id. at 320, 932 A.2d 632; see id. at 321–22, 932 A.2d 632–33 (citing statistics from the
U.S. Census Bureau about the composition of households across the country).
142. Id. at 322, 932 A.2d at 633.
143. Id. at 325, 932 A.2d at 635.
144. Id. at 326, 932 A.2d at 635.
145. Id. at 329, 932 A.2d at 638 (Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 326–27, 932 A.2d at 636. Importantly, Judge Raker’s opinion does not focus
on whether banning same-sex marriage is constitutional, but rather on whether depriving
same-sex couples of the benefits and privileges that accompany marriage is constitutional.
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interest in providing for the offspring that may result from heterosexual intimacy, an interest that the State claimed was preserved by section 2-201, was wholly irrational.147 She explained that “Maryland’s
equal protection jurisprudence requires that a legislative distinction
reasonably relate to the achievement of a legitimate State interest,”148
and that, in this case, there was not a sufficient link between the
State’s alleged interest in procreation and section 2-201.149
The legislature, Judge Raker proposed, should “either amend the
marriage statutes to include same-sex couples or create a parallel statutory structure” to provide them with the same rights afforded opposite-sex couples.150 Chief Judge Bell concurred with Judge Raker’s
opinion to the extent that it mandated such rights for same-sex
couples, but disagreed with Judge Raker’s belief that the court should
examine section 2-201 under rational basis review.151
Chief Judge Bell filed a dissenting opinion,152 reasoning that section 2-201 merited strict scrutiny for three reasons. First, Chief Judge
Bell agreed with Judge Battaglia’s dissenting argument that section 2201 created a sex-based classification.153 Second, he asserted that
“[h]omosexuals meet the constitutional definition of a suspect class,
that is, a group whose defining characteristic is so seldom relevant to
the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in
such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.”154 Chief Judge Bell explained that “the majority dismisse[d] an
undisputed but extensive history of pervasive prejudice and discrimination targeted at homosexuals” to conclude improperly “that (1)
homosexuals have enough political power to effect the eventual establishment, by statute, of marriage or civil unions for same-sex couples;
and (2) this political power precludes their characterization as a susId. at 326, 932 A.2d at 635–36 (commenting that “entitlement to the rights of marriage and
the right to marry are distinct issues”).
147. See id. at 349, 932 A.2d at 650 (arguing that a same-sex marriage ban is not a rational means by which to realize the State’s alleged interest in preserving procreation and
child rearing).
148. Id. at 348–49, 932 A.2d at 649.
149. Id. at 349, 932 A.2d at 650. More specifically, Judge Raker adopted the same-sex
couples’ argument that, among other flaws, § 2-201 is both over-inclusive (because children can be born into same-sex relationships), and under-inclusive (because not all opposite-sex couples have children). Id. at 347, 932 A.2d at 648.
150. Id. at 327, 932 A.2d at 636.
151. Id. at 356, 932 A.2d at 654.
152. Id. at 421, 932 A.2d at 693 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 421 & n.1, 932 A.2d at 693 & n.1.
154. Id. at 421 n.1, 932 A.2d at 693 n.1 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 27 (2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting)).
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pect class.”155 The Chief Judge argued that the majority’s denial that
homosexuals are a politically powerless class was unfounded and, in
any event, political power did not preclude their characterization as a
suspect class.156 Third, Chief Judge Bell contended that section 2-201
hindered the fundamental right to marriage, disagreeing with the majority that the case required the court to determine whether same-sex
marriage was a fundamental right, and stating instead that the fundamental right to marriage in general was the “real issue in this case.”157
In addition, Chief Judge Bell argued that, even under rational
basis review, section 2-201 was unconstitutional.158 He rejected the
majority’s argument that limiting marriage to heterosexual couples is
reasonably related to the State’s interest in fostering procreation, reasoning that “‘the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from marriage in
no way furthers this interest. There are enough marriage licenses to
go around for everyone.’”159
Judge Battaglia, joined by Chief Judge Bell,160 filed a lengthy dissenting opinion arguing that section 2-201 created a sex-based classification that implicated the ERA.161 First, Judge Battaglia noted that
government action implicating the ERA is subject to strict scrutiny.162
Section 2-201, she argued, must therefore be strictly scrutinized.163
However, concluding that the State’s alleged interest in “retaining
traditional marriage present[ed] an issue of triable fact,” Judge Bat-

155. Id. at 422, 932 A.2d at 694.
156. Id. at 422–23, 932 A.2d at 694.
157. Id. at 425, 932 A.2d at 695–96.
158. Id. at 427, 932 A.2d at 697.
159. Id. at 428, 932 A.2d at 697 (quoting Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (2006)).
Chief Judge Bell also rejected the majority’s argument that the mere “‘possibility of procreation’” creates a sufficiently reasonable link between § 2-201 and the State’s interest in fostering procreation. Id. at 428–29, 932 A.2d at 698.
160. Id. at 356, 932 A.2d at 654 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 356–57, 932 A.2d at 654. Specifically, Judge Battaglia argued that the majority improperly rebuffed the same-sex couples’ gender discrimination argument using the
“equal application” theory. Id., 932 A.2d at 654–55. This theory, in Judge Battaglia’s view,
was analogous to the discredited “separate but equal” approach that erroneously exempted
statutes that equally benefit or burden the sexes from strict scrutiny. Id. But see supra note
121 (explaining the majority’s argument that this description mischaracterizes the “equal
application theory”). Judge Battaglia then described in great detail Maryland and other
state cases rejecting the argument that laws benefiting or burdening the sexes equally are
exempt from strict scrutiny. See id. at 358, 932 A.2d at 655–71.
162. See id. at 399, 932 A.2d at 680 (maintaining that any law that “draws sex-based distinctions,” regardless of whether the law imposes a burden or confers a benefit entirely
upon either males or females, implicates the ERA and is subject to strict scrutiny).
163. Id. at 419, 932 A.2d at 692.
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taglia would have remanded the case to the circuit court for a full
evidentiary hearing.164
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Conaway v. Deane, the Court of Appeals of Maryland employed
rational basis review to hold constitutional a statute prohibiting samesex marriage in Maryland.165 The Conaway majority declined to
strictly scrutinize the statute, in part because it concluded that sexual
orientation did not establish suspect class status for equal protection
purposes.166 In finding no suspect status, the majority pointed to the
Supreme Court’s four “indicia of suspect or quasi-suspect classes”—
history of purposeful unequal treatment; group characteristics that
bear no relation to its members’ abilities to contribute to society; political powerlessness; and immutability.167 Prior to Conaway, however,
Maryland courts had included only the first two indicia in their test for
suspect classification.168
The Conaway court’s alteration of Maryland’s unique equal protection analysis had two unfortunate results.169 First, via an unjustified
departure from settled Maryland precedent, the Conaway majority deprived same-sex couples of deserved suspect classification.170 Second,
the Conaway court similarly dispossessed future Maryland groups seeking suspect classification of the potentially greater equal protection
historically available under Maryland’s own constitution by prospectively adopting federal suspect class analysis and locking Maryland
courts into step with an increasingly conservative Supreme Court.171
Instead, the court should have preserved Maryland’s independent
equal protection jurisprudence by applying, or at least giving proper
weight to, Maryland’s own suspect class definition.

164. Id. at 420, 932 A.2d at 693.
165. See supra Part III.
166. See supra Part III.B. While the Conaway court also examined the Maryland same-sex
marriage ban under gender discrimination and fundamental rights, this Note focuses on
the court’s equal protection analysis.
167. Conaway, 401 Md. at 277–78, 932 A.2d at 606 (majority opinion) (outlining these
factors to determine whether a statute merits “a more exacting constitutional analysis”).
168. See supra Part II.C.
169. See infra Part IV.A–B.
170. See infra Part IV.A.
171. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. To Deny Homosexuals Suspect Classification, the Conaway Court
Ignored Settled Maryland Precedent by Engaging in
“Unreflective Adoption” of Supreme Court Indicia of
Suspectness and Giving Undue Weight to Those
Federal Factors in Applying its Suspect Class Test
When it grafted new federal analysis onto its prior suspect class
definition, the Conaway court engaged in “unreflective adoptionism,”
an approach that scholars have coined to define state courts’ application of “federal analysis to a state clause without acknowledging the
possibility of a different outcome, or considering arguments in favor
of such a different, or more protective, outcome.”172 While adopting
federal analysis for application to state law is not per se unjustifiable,
such “adoptionism” is appropriate only where state courts use federal
analysis after first thoroughly and independently evaluating the relevant state law.173
In Conaway, the court’s unreflective adoptionism allowed it to
overlook Maryland’s two-part suspect class definition that would have
provided same-sex couples greater equal protection than the hybrid
test.174 Rather than acknowledging the outcome under Maryland’s
more protective test, however, the court engaged in unreflective adoption by merely stressing that “Article 24 is construed at least to the
same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment,”175 and then conflating
the two-part test with federal analysis without explaining or justifying
its incorporation of the two additional federal factors.176
172. Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1505 (2005).
173. Id. at 1506 (quoting Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice:
Two Problems and a Response, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 864 (1991)). This superior method of
incorporation is known as “reflective adoption.” Id. Under the “reflective adoption” approach, state courts acknowledge the possibility of different state and federal outcomes,
considering the arguments on a case-by-case basis, and “on balance, decid[e] to apply federal analysis to the state provision.” Id.
174. Indeed, the majority conceded that homosexuals possessed both characteristics of
suspectness under the Maryland definition. See Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 282, 932
A.2d 571, 609 (2007) (stating in a heading that “there is a history of purposeful unequal
treatment of gay and lesbian persons, and homosexual persons are subject to unique disabilities not truly indicative of their abilities to contribute to society,” but quickly deemphasizing the concession by refusing to “hold that gay and lesbian persons are so politically
powerless that they constitute a suspect class”).
175. Id. at 279, 932 A.2d at 607.
176. See id. (explaining only that the court “find[s] useful in [its] analysis those additional criteria used by the Supreme Court in assessing claims of a new suspect or quasisuspect classification”). The Conaway court’s “unreflective adoption” of these federal factors contrasts with the suspect class analyses in Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407 (Conn. 2008), a recent Connecticut Supreme Court opinion upholding same-sex marriage. The Kerrigan court discussed for the first time the same four Supreme Court factors
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Unreflective adoption was particularly inappropriate in Conaway.
Prior to Conaway, the Court of Appeals of Maryland treated Article 24
separately from the Fourteenth Amendment to preserve the court’s
right to deviate from less protective Supreme Court decisions in the
future.177 The court constantly reserved this right, even when its decision would be the same under either constitution.178 In Conaway, for
the first time, the outcome would have been different under the two
suspect class definitions.179 For the first time, the court had an opportunity to provide greater equal protection under Article 24 than the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the court declined to take it, failing
even to reflect on the more protective outcome possible under the
State’s own definition.
The Conaway court further disregarded Maryland’s historical approach to equal protection in its application of the newly adopted Supreme Court indicia of suspectness by giving undue weight to those
new factors.180 In two short sentences, the majority dismissed with
troubling ease its concession that homosexuals (1) have “been the object of social prejudice” and (2) possess definitive characteristics “not
truly indicative of their abilities to contribute meaningfully to society,”181 the only two indicia of suspectness that the Maryland Court of
Appeals had previously included in its suspect class definition.182
With those sentences, which were relegated to the introduction of a
subsection denying homosexuals’ political powerlessness,183 the majority quickly brushed aside the latter element—ability to contribute
to society—and failed to mention it again. The majority addressed
the former element several paragraphs later, when it again conceded
in passing that “[i]t is clear that homosexual persons, at least in terms
of contemporary history, have been a disfavored group.”184 Inexplicably, however, the majority concluded that “in light of the other indicia”
that the Conaway court considered. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 425–26. Unlike the Conaway
court, however, the Kerrigan court justified its adoption of these factors by explaining that
it had never previously articulated “the specific criteria to be considered in determining
whether recognition as a quasi-suspect class is warranted.” Id. The Maryland Court of
Appeals lacked a comparable explanation.
177. See supra Part II.B.
178. See supra Part II.B.
179. See infra notes 181–191 and accompanying text (contrasting the majority’s concession that same-sex couples possess the characteristics of suspect class under Maryland’s
traditional approach with the majority’s denial of suspect class status based on new federal
elements of suspectness).
180. See infra notes 181–200 and accompanying text.
181. Conaway, 401 Md. at 282, 932 A.2d at 609.
182. See supra Part II.C.
183. Conaway, 401 Md. at 282, 932 A.2d at 609.
184. Id. at 285, 932 A.2d at 610.
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of suspectness, “a history of unequal treatment does not require [the
court to] deem suspect a classification based on sexual orientation.”185
Ironically, after affording virtually no weight to these two important
elements,186 the majority professed instead to “view the circumstances
as a whole” to decide whether same-sex couples merit suspect
classification.187
The majority plainly did not consider “the circumstances as a
whole.” Instead, after swiftly dismissing the two Maryland elements of
suspectness, the majority divided its entire analysis into two parts: one
denying that homosexuals are politically powerless,188 and the other
claiming that homosexuality may not be an immutable trait.189 When
the majority first laid out its test for suspectness, it claimed that those
two “additional criteria,” would be “useful” in its analysis.190 In application, however, the factors were dispositive, not merely “useful” to
the majority’s suspect class decision—the majority denied that homosexuals constituted a suspect class under Article 24 based solely on the
arguments that homosexuality might not be immutable, and that
homosexuals suffer insufficient political powerlessness to deserve
heightened legal protection.191
185. Id., 932 A.2d at 610–11 (emphasis added).
186. See id. at 422, 932 A.2d at 694 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
dismissed too swiftly “an undisputed but extensive history of pervasive prejudice and discrimination targeted at homosexuals”).
187. Id. at 285–86, 932 A.2d at 611 (majority opinion).
188. See id. at 282–90, 932 A.2d at 609–14 (pointing to Maryland statutes, regulations,
and judicial decisions protecting homosexuals against discrimination in areas like public
accommodation, employment, housing, education, and child custody to deny the group’s
lack of political powerlessness).
189. See id. at 291–94, 932 A.2d at 614–16 (rejecting the argument that homosexuality is
an immutable trait because there is no generally accepted scientific conclusion to that
effect).
190. Id. at 278–79, 932 A.2d at 606–07.
191. See supra Part III.B. Affording the new indicia of suspectness such weight was also
inapt because the majority’s arguments that homosexuals failed to meet those indicia were
substantively feeble. First, with respect to political powerlessness, Chief Judge Bell stressed
that the majority’s argument that homosexuals have enough political power to preclude
their characterization as a suspect class was unfounded. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 422, 932
A.2d at 694 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (finding as evidence of Maryland homosexuals’ lack of
political power that “Maryland has not adopted, and it may safely be said, is not on the
verge of adopting, a comprehensive statewide domestic partnership scheme for same-sex
couples that approximates the institution of civil marriage”). With regard to the immutability factor, even the majority did not argue that homosexuality is not an immutable trait.
See id. at 293 n.57, 932 A.2d at 615–16 n.57 (majority opinion). Rather, based on the
court’s own research into scientific studies about the immutability of homosexuality, see id.
at 292–93 n.57, 932 A.2d 615–16 n.57, the majority determined that the conclusions of
studies conflict and therefore declined “to recognize sexual orientation as an immutable
trait and therefore a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.” Id. at 294, 932 A.2d at 616.
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Affording exclusive weight to the political power and immutability factors was inappropriate for two reasons. First, in so doing, the
court erroneously treated the four indicia as required elements. Normally, courts balance the totality of the factors in a flexible manner to
determine suspect classification.192 But the Conaway court inaccurately applied a conjunctive test when it denied same-sex couples suspect status based solely on its belief that homosexuality may not be
immutable and is not linked with political powerlessness, without even
considering the other factors.193 The Supreme Court of Iowa, in recently upholding same-sex marriage, denounced just such a flawed application of the factors. The Iowa court flatly rejected the argument
that if the immutability and political powerlessness “elements” are not
satisfied the suspect class argument must fail.194 Any effort to treat
the factors as essential elements, it explained, “overlooks the flexible
manner in which the Supreme Court has applied the four factors in
the past.”195
Second, the court’s exclusive consideration of the second two factors—immutability and political power—was especially inappropriate
because, as Maryland and several other state courts have suggested,
those factors are the least crucial to suspect class analysis.196 Prior to
Conaway, the Maryland Court of Appeals had repeatedly declined to
include those very indicia in its suspect class definition.197 Tellingly,
neither party even raised the issue of immutability in its brief; still, the
court unexpectedly elected to consider that factor on its own.198 In
their recent affirmations of same-sex marriage, the highest courts of
192. See supra Part II.C.
193. See supra notes 181–191 and accompanying text.
194. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 888–89 (Iowa 2009) (commenting that “immutability of the characteristics and political powerlessness of the group . . . supplement
the analysis as a means to discern whether a need for heightened scrutiny exists,” and are
not “essential elements”).
195. Id. at 888.
196. See id. at 889 (noting that these two factors are merely a “supplement” to suspect
class analysis).
197. See supra Part II.C. Indeed, the Waldron court quoted Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia to define a suspect class as “a category of people who have ‘experienced a
history of purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique disabilities on the
basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.’” Attorney Gen. v.
Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 706, 426 A.2d 929, 941–42 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)). Notably, the Murgia
Court did include “political powerlessness” in its definition. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313
(defining suspect class). But the Waldron court decidedly did not include that part of the
Murgia definition. Waldron, 289 Md. at 706, 426 A2d at 941–42.
198. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 292 n.57, 932 A.2d at 615 n.57 (addressing the question of
immutability despite the fact that neither party mentioned it in its brief, in part because
the issue is the subject of recent studies and debate).
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both Connecticut and Iowa agreed that the first two factors—history
of discrimination and ability to contribute to society—are far more
crucial than the other two.199 Those courts argued that the first two
factors merit more weight because they are frequently dispositive,
while the second factors, immutability and political power, are mere
“supplements” to suspect class analysis.200
By inexplicably granting undue weight to immutability and political powerlessness, the very two indicia that prior courts specifically
chose not to include in Article 24’s suspect class definition,201 the
Conaway majority deprived Maryland’s homosexual community of the
suspect status it deserves under Article 24.
B. The Conaway Court Similarly Deprived Future Maryland Groups
Seeking Suspect Classification of the Potentially Greater Equal
Protection Historically Available Under Maryland’s
Constitution by Prospectively Adopting the Supreme
Court’s Suspect Class Test
Not only did the Conaway court’s adoption of the federal suspect
class test deny the Maryland homosexual community its deserved suspect classification—it also may have denied to future Maryland groups
seeking suspect classification the possibility of the greater protection
historically available under Article 24.202 This wholesale adoption of
federal analysis could lock Maryland courts into step with an increasingly conservative Supreme Court, leaving Maryland much less in control of its own equal protection jurisprudence.203
Prior to Conaway, Maryland courts analyzing equal protection distinguished Article 24 from the Fourteenth Amendment, preserving
Article 24’s ability to provide greater protections of individual liberties.204 In fact, the Waldron court “left open the possibility that Article
24 . . . may require a result at variance with the Supreme Court’s application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s [E]qual [P]rotection
199. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 888–89, 896, 906 (striking down as unconstitutional
Iowa’s ban on same-sex marriage and deeming the history of discrimination and ability to
contribute to society as the only two factors that “have always been present when heightened scrutiny has been applied”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 426,
431–32, 482 (Conn. 2008) (invalidating Connecticut’s legislative ban on same-sex marriage
as unconstitutional and commenting that the first two indicia of suspectness are “required,” while the latter two are merely “other considerations”).
200. See supra notes 96–100, 199 and accompanying text.
201. See supra Part II.C.
202. See infra notes 204–215 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 208–219 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Part II.B.
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[C]lause.”205 Maryland courts in the wake of Waldron preserved that
possibility of greater protection until Conaway.206 With respect to suspect classification in particular, despite “reluctance on the part of the
Maryland court to expand the number of interests and suspect classes
triggering review greater than ‘rational basis,’” prior to Conaway, “it
ha[d] not precluded the possibility of such action in the future.”207
Conaway may have thwarted that possibility by applying a more
stringent Supreme Court test in lieu of the two-factor test for suspectness that Maryland courts had used since Waldron,208 thereby engaging in “prospective lockstepping” with Supreme Court analysis.209
State courts engage in a form of “prospective lockstepping” when they
adopt a Supreme Court “test, formula, or mode of reasoning” used to
interpret the federal Constitution.210 This implies that the state court
will continue to apply the federal test in the future,211 operating as a
“precommitment device” or “irrebuttable presumption” that the state
court must decide future cases “the same way the United States Supreme Court has decided, or would decide, the same issue under the
federal constitution.”212 Thus, by adopting this new federal test, the
Conaway court likely closed the window that Waldron had left open to
the possibility of expanding equal protection to find new suspect classes where the Supreme Court would not have done so.
Conaway’s lockstepping approach to equal protection is particularly likely to deny future Maryland groups suspect classification because the Supreme Court, since the 1980’s, has been increasingly
inclined to “curtail the recognition of new rights or liberties and to
even rescind some that were previously granted.”213 With respect to
205. MICHAEL CARLTON TOLLEY, STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN MARYLAND 6–7 (1992)
(emphasis added).
206. See supra Part II.B.
207. TOLLEY, supra note 205, at 77.
208. See supra Part III.B.
209. This unfortunate approach occurs where state courts adopt “‘apparently in
perpetuity, all existing or future United States Supreme Court interpretations of a federal
constitutional provision as the governing interpretation of the parallel state constitutional
provision.’” Williams, supra note 172, at 1499 (emphasis added) (quoting Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1161 (1985)).
210. Id. at 1514.
211. See id. (“[I]t operates as an announced approach of ongoing, or prospective, deference to federal constitutional doctrine.”).
212. Id. at 1523.
213. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW XVI (2008); see also id. at XI (“[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has
become increasingly conservative and antipathetic, if not hostile, to the recognition of individual rights.”).

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR407.txt

2009]

unknown

CONAWAY V. DEANE

Seq: 29

17-JUN-09

11:33

985

suspect classification in particular, since the Supreme Court’s classification of illegitimate children as quasi-suspect, it has adamantly refused to recognize any new suspect or semi-suspect classifications.214
This halted possible expansion of protection under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.215
The frozen state of federal equal protection highlights the inopportuneness of Conaway’s lockstepping techniques. Indeed, scholars
have noted that “prospective lockstepping” is especially troubling
“where the United States Supreme Court ‘underenforce[s]’ certain
federal constitutional norms, such as the Equal Protection Clause.”216
In such cases, state courts are especially justified in diverging from the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Constitution.217 In
fact, many state courts have begun to afford more protection of equality than the Supreme Court by focusing their attention on the equality
provisions in their own constitutions in a movement known as the
“New Judicial Federalism.”218 Unfortunately, in the midst of this great
revolution, the Conaway court, it seems, has rendered Maryland more
dependent upon federal interpretation of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment than ever before.219
214. Id. at 11 (noting that when the Supreme Court classified illegitimate children as
quasi-suspect, “[c]lassifications based on race, national origin, or alienage were suspect;
classifications based on gender or against non-marital children were semi-suspect; and
there the list ended”).
215. Id. at 11–12.
216. Williams, supra note 172, at 1501 (alteration in original).
217. Id. Moreover, scholars have concluded that where areas of constitutional law are
unsettled, states must have the option of providing greater liberties than the federal Constitution might. See, e.g., TOLLEY, supra note 205, at 77–78 (“If the federal Constitution
does not protect the asserted right . . . or federal law is unsettled . . . then the Maryland
court turns to its state constitution and often has found the authority to expand the right
in question.”). The Conaway court mentioned that classification of homosexuals for equal
protection purposes is unsettled, pointing out that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court has
characterized repeatedly as suspect classes distinctions based on race, alienage, and national origin, the Court has not addressed expressly whether sexual orientation is considered suspect, thereby implicating strict or heightened scrutiny.” Conaway v. Deane, 401
Md. 219, 279, 932 A.2d 571, 607 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
218. See SHAMAN, supra note 213, at XVI–XVII, 17. Professor Shaman explains that “[a]t
least twenty-one states have ruled that their state equality guarantees afford greater protection than the [Fourteenth Amendment],” and that some states have maintained the basic
two to three-tier structure for determining the appropriate standard of scrutiny, but have
“increased the scope of one or another of the upper tiers by recognizing various classifications or rights calling for heightened scrutiny that are not recognized as such in the federal
system.” Id. at 17. For example, Professor Shaman points out, “[a] number of
states . . . have upgraded gender classifications from intermediate to strict scrutiny.” Id.
219. See supra notes 204–215 and accompanying text. As Professor Shaman points out, it
is important to note that new federalism is not an exclusively judicial phenomenon. SHAMAN, supra note 213, at XXII. Through state constitutional amendments, some state legislatures have “expressly creat[ed] new individual rights that have no counterpart in the
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CONCLUSION

The Conaway court’s adoption and application of Supreme Court
suspect class analysis ignored Maryland precedent, dismissed Article
24’s long-celebrated independence from federal jurisprudence, and
prevented future Maryland courts from affording stronger equal protection guarantees than would the increasingly conservative Supreme
Court.220 In the late 1970’s, Justice Brennan proclaimed that “state
courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution” for state protections “often extend[ ] beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of federal law.”221 Without “the independent protective force of state
law,” he continued, “the full realization of our liberties cannot be
guaranteed.”222 Maryland courts have long recognized this notion
that the U.S. Constitution is a floor, not a ceiling, when it comes to
guaranteeing individual rights—Maryland’s own constitution can afford its citizens more, but not less, protection than the U.S. Constitution.223 Instead of unreflectively replacing well-established Maryland
equal protection jurisprudence with less-protective federal analysis,
the Conaway majority should have preserved the state constitution’s
ability to protect Maryland citizens more fully by applying Maryland’s
own suspect class definition or at least giving sufficient weight to the
two indicia that comprise it, to deem homosexuals a suspect class,
thereby subjecting the statutory prohibition on same-sex marriage to
the strict scrutiny it merits.

Federal Constitution.” Id. Maryland, for example, adopted its ERA to prevent discrimination based on sex after the attempt to add an ERA to the Federal Constitution failed. See
Conaway, 401 Md. at 246–47 & n.15, 932 A.2d at 587 & n.15 (explaining the legislative
history of the ERA).
220. See supra Part IV.
221. William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 56 Md. App. 54, 60, 466 A.2d 546, 549 (1983) (recognizing
that “while states may not circumscribe federal constitutional rights, they may grant greater
rights under their own constitutions, provided those greater rights do not impinge upon
federal constitutional rights”); see also supra Part II.B.

